Main Model United Nations Conference
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
18th Session
2nd to 5th of March 2023

SDGs – Leave No One Behind

BACKGROUND

GUIDE

Peacebuilding Commission

Hager Ali
Lilly Spahr

Main Model United Nations Conference 2023

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Honourable Delegates,

We, Lilly and Ruby, in the name of the entire team, welcome you to the 18th edition of the MainMUN conference in Frankfurt. We will be your chairs for the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

We would like to use this opportunity and introduce ourselves. My name is Lilly Spahr, and I study Political Science and Cultural Anthropology here at the Goethe University. I have attended MUN conferences six times as a delegate and have always loved it. This is my first-time chairing and I am looking forward to it very much. I hope to see you all in March!

I am Ruby and am currently studying law in Berlin while also finishing my Political Science Bachelor in Frankfurt. In my first year of university, I attended my first MainMUN, starting off shyly in the large General Assembly. However, four MUNs later I ended up chairing last year's Security Council and this year I am very excited to chair this interesting committee in person. My advice: definitely, have fun and get to know people! Also, relax, everyone here has had different experiences and don't let that intimidate you but get up and contribute your opinions. Use moments in 'unmods' or socials to ask your co-delegates or us for help or any tips. I'm sure we will get through our challenges, and look forward to your discussions, memes and finally seeing you in person!

The two topics that will be discussed in the PBC at MainMUN 2023 are

1. Peacekeeping in the Sahel Region

2. Integrating Youth into Peacebuilding

Please note that the Background Guide is used to give you an overview of the topics, and you need to do some research on your own regarding the policies and opinions of the country you will be representing. We highly recommend that you write a position paper. If you hand it in before the 20th of February we can give you feedback, so that you can be secure in your positions and your country's stance on the topics. We are looking forward to seeing you at MainMUN 2023!

Lilly and Ruby

2. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

The United Nations Peace Building Commission was established in 2005 through resolutions A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645 (2005) of the General Assembly and the Security Council to support peacebuilding efforts in conflict-prone regions as intergovernmental advisory body. The PBC advises and briefs several UN organs as well as the WTO on matters of women, peace, security, United Nations Transitions, conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. The objective is to fosters coherent approaches to peacebuilding and to build partnerships with regional organizations and international financial institutions to advocate for peacebuilding finance. As such, it does not publish resolutions, but formulates reports.

Its 31 member states are elected from the UNGA, UNSC and ECOSOC in addition to the top financial and troop-contributors within the United Nations (UNPBC, 2023). The General Assembly elected Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Lebanon and South Africa to the PBC. China, France, Kenya, Mexico, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States were elected by the UN Security Council, while Colombia, Latvia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, the Republic of Korea and Thailand were appointed by ECOSOC. As of 2022, the top providers of military and paramilitary personnel are Bangladesh, which also chairs the PBC with the Dominican Republic as vice-chair, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda. The top budgetary contributors to the United Nations fund who are also members of the PBC are Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

The PBC supports peace building activities which directly contribute to post-conflict stabilization and makes recommendations, monitors progress, garners financial support for peacebuilding, and works heavily with partners in the UN system. The PBC also communicates with the UN Secretariat through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) which supports and advises the PBC, coordinates UN agencies in their overall peacebuilding efforts, and manages the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBC's 'Working Group on Lessons Learned' additionally evaluates previous post-conflict reconstruction efforts to advance existing strategies and develop new approaches.

Within the UN system, the PBC is unprecedented in its organization and mandate, as it is the first single organ combining capacities and expertise from many UN organs that deal with different aspects of peacebuilding, benefitting from the UN experience in this field and streamlining the efforts to increase UNs efficiency in providing international peace and security. Current countries on the PBC agenda include Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic. The work of the PBC should aim at developing best practices and expanding the period of attention given to regions that undergo post-conflict recovery (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 2022).

3. Peacekeeping versus Peacebuilding

Peacekeeping accompanies or even precedes peacebuilding operations and is based on the three of consent of involved parties, impartiality and non-use of force except for self-defense and defense of the mandate (UNPK, 2023a). Involved conflict parties must consent to the implementation of UN peacekeeping operations, as otherwise it would restrict the UN's ability to carry out its tasks and risk violating the second principle of impartiality. In peacekeeping, relations are maintained with the main parties to the conflict while infractions on either side should be penalized. The United Nations Security Council can authorize the use of military force in peacekeeping operations, which can entail issuing robust mandates for all necessary military means to protect civilians against imminent attacks, maintain political order, and to deter further attacks on it.

It is crucial to note that peacekeeping is not the same as counterinsurgency, nor should these terms be used interchangeably. Counterinsurgency operations may take place during the onset of peacekeeping, but do not abide by the same principles as UN peacekeeping missions. Modern Counterinsurgency heavily relies on the use of coercive military force to clear threats, does not require the consent of any involved conflict party, and is always partial to the government hosting the conflict by because it designates other conflict parties as illegitimate insurgents (Howard, 2019). Though newer iterations of counterinsurgency warfare involve gaining the trust of the indigenous population, as in the case of ISAF and Resolute Support in Afghanistan, these operations typically involve clearing insurgent threats to secure territory to consolidate a safe environment where the primary responsibility of security can be transferred back to the central authority (Ali, 2021a).

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, encompasses combined efforts to combat conflict outbreak, development and escalation after the transition to peace with the aim to create sustainable and long-term peace (International Alert, 2022). Peacebuilding therefore requires communication between all participating parties and actors. There is no one way of peacebuilding, rather it constitutes a combination of actions which can include things such as mediation, education and peacekeeping missions. Peacebuilding measures are carried out by various groups of people including organizations (such as the United Nations and the European Union) who often work together with individual nations.

Peacebuilding is connected to the 16th goal of the Sustainable Development Goals to "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" (UNDESA, 2022). Specifically Target 16.7, "Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels", related to the integration of youth into peacebuilding (UNDESA, 2022).

As education matters in nurturing sustainable peace, goal 4 of quality education, plays an important role. Overall, the development of peacebuilding can be connected to the Sustainable Development Goals as the creation of sustainable peace facilitates an environment where the other goals can be realized - it is easier to ensure that, for example, goal 5 (achieving gender equality) or goal 8 (decent work and economic growth) can be achieved, when people are not fighting for their survival in areas of conflict. It is also important to ensure that those participating in peacebuilding measures are doing so in safe, equal, diverse and just working environments.

4. Topic 1: Peacekeeping in the Sahel Region

The 'United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel' designates Mauretania, Mali, Senegal, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon as the so-called Sahel Region (UNISS, 2023). But in a wider geographic sense, the Sahel-Region also includes Sudan and South Sudan, Western Sahara, the South of Algeria, and the South of Libya in the Arab world. The Sahel Crisis is multilayered and complex because many of the ongoing crises transgress state borders and often even challenge them with wide-reaching implications on geopolitical stability.

As of January 2023, there are 12 ongoing peacekeeping missions by the United Nations, some in collaboration with the African Union, others with the European Union (UNDPO, 2023). Mali, Western Sahara, Libya, and the Sudans are the focus of currently ongoing peacekeeping operations, but each of these crises has wider geopolitical implications.

4.1. Peacekeeping Operation MINUSMA in Mali

The **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)** began in 2013 with the goal to stabilize Mali and the Sahel and to support transitional authority in Mali in restoring security, stability, and a democratic transition (MINUSMA, 2023). In the same timeframe, MINUSMA is supplemented with the **European Union Training Mission (EUTM)** to support the Malian central government with training of Malian security personnel in intelligence, communication, operation leadership and medical corps (EUTM, 2023), and the **European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP)**.

Mali's ethnically diverse population is concentrated in the southern wing around Bamako, whereas the nomadic Tuareg are dispersed in the northern wing. Since Mali's colonial independence from France, the Tuareg have staged multiple rebellions with the goal of secessionism and independence of Northern Mali. Governance in Bamako has also been disrupted by eight failed and successful coup attempts since independence – the most recent coup attempt in May 2021 (Powell & Thyne, 2022). In 2012 for instance, Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted through a military coup shortly before presidential elections due to dissatisfaction over the handling of the 2012 Tuareg Rebellion. The prevalence of military coups accelerated state failure because each coup uprooted vital political institutions anew.

As of October 2022, a new constitution was drafted, though ongoing violence in the border between Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali limits optimism about stability in Mali as do significantly increased humanitarian needs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As of January 2023 the United Nations

Deployed number of personnel as of June 2022

17.557
Total personnel

3.384 Civilians
1.744 Police
506 Staff Officer
11.726 Troops
197 UN Volunteers

Authorised number of personnel

15,209
Total uniformed personnel

13,289 Military personnel *
1,920 Police (including formed units)
An appropriate civilian component

Figure 1: Deployed MINUSMA personnel as of June 2022. Source: UN Peacekeeping

Security Council extended its mandate for MINUSMA until 30 June 2023 (UNSC, 2023b), though Germany plans to withdraw by 2024.

Since its deployment, MINUSMA became the most dangerous ongoing peacekeeping operation in the Sahel-region with 293 fatalities, as MINURSO staff became the target of insurgent attacks (UNPK, 2023b).

4.2. Special Political Mission MINURSO and the Special Envoy for Western Sahara

The **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)** is an observer-mission that monitors the ceasefire between the Kingdom of Morocco and the *Frente Polisario* representing Western Sahara, or the Sahrawi Republic, to prepare a referendum on the secession of Western Sahara (MINURSO, 2023). The Sahrawi territory was annexed by Morocco after colonial independence from Spain, when a power vacuum emerged after Spain relinquished the territory in 1976. The Sahrawi territory was divided between Mauretania and Morocco through the Western Sahara Partition Agreement in 1976, where Morocco incorporated two thirds of the territory as Southern Province, whereas Mauretania occupied the remaining third until it withdrew in 1979. Since then, Morocco built a sand wall to entrench its administrative authority over strategically important territory in Western Sahara, whereas *Frente Polisario* claims the comparatively uninhabited rest as Free Land.

The Sahrawi territory with its suspected oil fields remains disputed to today, though the United Nations recognizes the Sahrawi Republic's right to self-determination and *Frente Polisario* as the Sahrawi Republic's legitimate political representative. From 1991 on, the United Nations sponsored a

Deployed number of personnel as of June 2022
(Civilian data as of May 2018)

464 Total personnel

- 230 Civilians
- 194 Experts on Mission
- 2 Police
- 7 Staff Officer
- 20 Troops
- 11 UN Volunteers

Authorised number of personnel

245 Total uniformed personnel

- 245 Military personnel *

Figure 2: Deployed MINURSO personnel as of June 2022. Source: UN Peacekeeping

ceasefire agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and *Frente Polisario*. Currently, 245 uniformed personnel are stationed in Western Sahara in addition to civilian personnel.

Despite the ceasefire, some low-level hostilities across the sand wall between the Moroccan Royal Army and Frente Polisario continued well into 2023 and the UNSC critiques that the lack of access to areas near the sand wall complicate MINURSO's observational activities on the ground (UNSC, 2023a).

4.3. Special Political Mission UNITAMS and Peacekeeping Operation UNISFA in Sudan

The **United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)** is the most recent mission in Sudan (UNITAMS, 2023), after UNMIS until the secession of South Sudan and UNISFA since the secession. UNITAM's chief objective is to assist in Sudan's political transition, offer electoral assistance, and support the democratic transition since long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir was ousted in Sudan's Arab Spring in 2019. In addition to supporting the implementation of the 2019 transitional declaration in Sudan, UNITAMS supports the protection of civilians and peacebuilding with special focus on Darfur, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile state.

Like Mali, Sudan is one of the world's most coup-prone countries, with 16 failed and successful coup attempts since its colonial independence (Powell & Thyne, 2022). Since UNITAMS' implementation, another military coup disrupted Sudan's democratization in October 2021, when Abdefattah Al-Burhan took power and formally voided consensus between military and civilian in the transition to democracy. UNITAMS continued its operations after the miliary coup as the humanitarian situation remains dire with more than 250 000 displaced people and some progress in reaching a power-sharing deal between military government and civilians (UNSC, 2022).

The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was authorized in 2011 by the UNSC (UNISFA, 2023b). Since the secession of South Sudan, the resource rich Abyei Province remained disputed territory that is claimed by both, South Sudan, and North Sudan. The residents of Abyei were not granted the right to vote in the 2011 independence referendum and tensions over the region flared up during South Sudan's secession. UNISFA protects civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei, trains police services in Abyei, and supports in de-mining the area (UNISFA, 2023a).

4.4. Peacekeeping Operation UNMISS in South Sudan

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, 2023) is the direct successor of the **United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)** from 2005 to 2011 and therefore shares some of its objectives. The original goal of UNMIs was the consolidation of peace after the Sudanese Civil War through protecting civilians, UN personnel and facilities, securing access to humanitarian aid,

documenting the human rights situation, as well as the implementation of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.

Like MINURSO, UNMISS is an observer-mission with the goal of advisory to support state and nation-building in South Sudan after its civil war in 2013 and its secession from Sudan. While Sudan's former southern provinces successfully separated, the Abyei province is disputed territory between both countries. When violence broke out in Juba in 2013 and quickly spread in South Sudan, more than 80 000 civilians fled to UNMISS compounds, which shifted the mission's priority to the protection of civilians and required UNMISS compounds to be turned into refugee camps for displaced people as the intensity of conflict declined over time (UNMISS, 2023).

4.5. Special Political Mission UNSMIL in Libya

UN Support Mission for Libya, Tripoli, is an integrated mission involving all UN Agencies, Funds, and programs. It aims to support an inclusive transition, building governance and the Rule of Law in Libya, human development, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNSMIL, 2023). The transitional process should engage women, youth, and marginalized groups as the Amazigh in Libya. The Security Council renewed its mandate in July 2022, and tasked UNSMIL to support the ceasefire through ceasefire monitors and confidence-building measures.

Libya's political trajectory and democratization prospects after the ouster of Gaddafi were complicated through war and the institutional legacy of Gaddafi's rule. Political parties, parliaments, and other important political organs were criminalized in Libya until the Arab Spring. After failed coup attempts in the 1970s, Gaddafi engineered factions between higher and lower ranks in the Libyan army to weaken it enough to keep in check, but not enough to incapacitate its function in peace time. The lack of an effective centralized army as well as institutions like party systems continuously hinder democratic progress in Libya; new parties formed since 2011 are difficult to distinguish and complicate the political participation of all Libyans while the lack of a centralized army poses a continuous risk of electoral violence and destabilization (Ali, 2021b).

4.6. Transnational Crises and Instability

All of the Sahelian conflicts in which UN Peacekeeping Missions or Special Political Missions currently take place share a complicated history of **state and nation building** with disputed territories and secessionism by ethnoreligious minorities. Central administrations have a **limited reach** throughout the territory and **peripheries are neglected or actively disenfranchised**. **Repeated military coups** in Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan disrupt democratic progress und uproot important political institutions, which undermines governance in each affected country and accelerates statelessness and partial or complete collapse (Ali, 2023; Ali, Ben Hammou, & Powell, 2022)

In absence of stable centralized government that can keep order and ensuring the political participation of all citizens in all parts of a country's territory, **insurgencies and political violence** becomes rampant. Sahara territory is often difficult to administer not only because of its remoteness from more urbanized areas close to capitals, but also because central governments deliberately neglect the arid periphery for various reasons.

The fall of Gaddafi in the course of the Arab Spring fueled **arms trafficking** in the region because much of his arsenal was looted and sold, and weapons from governments in the Sahel region even be traced to the conflicts in Yemen and Somalia (Oneko, 2017). The civil war in Libya also


Figure 3: Drug Trafficking Pathways in the Sahel and North Africa. Source: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

coincided with the Islamist Insurgency in Mali in 2012. **Drug trafficking** is used to finance the purchase of insurgents' weapons, equipment, and other tactical needs, while arms trade also militarizes the drug trade which brings unprecedented levels of violence in a region that is already politically and socio-economically volatile (CrisisGroup, 2018).

When the authority and oversight of central governments fails to reach a country's more remote areas, traffickers can use transnational corridors for transfer and transportation of drugs, weapons, and humans. Cannabis, cocaine and synthetic drugs can be freely funneled to Europe and other parts of the Middle East as a consequence (Herbert & Gallien, 2020).

Chronic instability, limited governance, as well as global warming additionally contributed to the emergence of **an unprecedented and fast-growing humanitarian crisis** in the Sahel region. The World Health Organization reports that over 33 million people across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, in the north of Cameroon, and in North-East Nigeria need living assistance (WHO, 2023). Ongoing conflicts left over 2.5 million displaced. **Increasingly common droughts** give an edge to already ongoing **land disputes**, as for example in the South of Sudan where drought pushed nomadic Berber tribes to settle near fertile lands belonging to Nuba and other indigenous peoples. The internal displacement of peoples also complicates political and democratic progress as gravely limits citizens' ability to participate in elections and therefore their safe access political representation. Especially in conflicts where ethnoreligious divisions play a salient role and minorities have been **politically and economically disenfranchised**, the integrity of any electoral process is undermined from the start.

5. Topic 2: Integrating Youth into Peacebuilding

Actively integrating youth into peacebuilding (including them in finding solutions and contributing to peacebuilding efforts) is a new undertaking. It is estimated that in 2016, of all the people in the world 1,2 billion were 15–29-year-olds and 1 in 4 of these were in some kind affected by conflict and violence (UNESCO 2019: 1). A large majority of youth live in countries of the global south, where conflict is more common (Ozerdem, 2016). Nonetheless, for a long time this part of the population has faced 'othering', often being categorized as either the victims or perpetrators of conflict. However, when it comes to dealing with conflicts, they are rarely seen as part of the solution (Ozerdem, 2016). This also acknowledges the need for intergenerational discourse. Another important pillar in peacebuilding are young women. Integrating their perspectives is important for justice and democracy (UNDP 2021).

5.1. "Peacebuilding Commission's Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding"

In 2021 the PBC approved the Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding in order to highlight the importance and further integrate young people into peacebuilding efforts (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2022). The plan itself is a checklist divided up into several focus areas each with their own core actions and indicators for successful change/ implementation in order for the PBC to be able to document the process. Specifically, the PBC will watch for the actual integration of youth into peacebuilding as well as the efficient communication between the Commission and other committees and bodies of the United Nations (Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC) as well as external partner organizations/ institutions (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2022a). Since the development of this action plan, progress has already been documented - for example, the number of youth representatives who have been invited to participate at PBC sessions has increased greatly in just one year from 5.4% (2020) to 44.4% (2021) (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2022c). Nonetheless, areas of improvement have also been noted.

This checklist is based on the Twin Resolutions A/RES/70/262 (General Assembly) and S/RES/2282 (Security Council) which are on the Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2022). Furthermore, it is also in line with the Security Council Resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018), 2535 (2020). Resolution 2250 and 2419 discuss youth, international peace and security and resolution 2535 is the third follow up resolution on this topic (Youth4Peace).

5.2. "Youth, Peace and Security: A Programming Handbook"

In addition to the action plan, the United Nations has a handbook which complements the checklist. This handbook, the "Youth, Peace and Security: A Programming Handbook" was created

collaboratively between the United Nations (specifically the United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Development Programme, Peacebuilding Support Office in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (United Nations Peacebuilding , 2022b). It aims to increase the implementation of the youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda in the various nations and regions around the world as well as in (transnational) organizations and networks - specifically the focus is put on the cooperation with youth-led/ youth-focused organizations such as UNICEF, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the European Youth Forum (see more examples in the handbook). Here specifically the starting point is to create a space for dialogue between the youth and the organizations. For example, last year the European Youth Forum launched the European Charter for Youth and Security in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions which was a direct exchange between young people and policy makers (European Youth Forum, 2022).

The first report from the Secretary General on this matter (released March 2020) has acknowledged the increase in cooperation with youths and calls for the further implementation of the five pillars from the Security Council resolution 2250 (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2022b). Additionally, a progress study was conducted which was appointed by the Secretary General.

5.3. Current Challenges

Integrating youth into peacebuilding is on paper a rather new undertaking and progress has been made, however there are still several challenges that need to be overcome –

> "In March 2020, the first report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on YPS was issued. The report demonstrated that, although there is a growing recognition of the essential role that young people play in peace and security, core challenges remain, including structural barriers limiting the participation of young people and their capacity to influence decision-making; violations of their human rights; and insufficient investment in facilitating their inclusion and empowerment," (United Nations and Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2021).

For example, it may be difficult for peacebuilding teams to fulfill a consultation and reach certain groups of youth because of safety and security reasons - thus, ironically, carrying out peacebuilding cannot be done due to the ongoing crisis (United Nations and Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2021). Therefore, conflict analysis is extremely important. Furthermore, it may be harder to communicate with young girls and women due to barriers created through gender inequality, especially in times of crisis.

A lot of current projects that connect peacebuilding and youth are connected with economic independence. The reason for this is the creation of opportunities through work and being financially stable (UNICEF 2023).

5.4. Current Examples

Youth and peacebuilding is a rather new concept to be implemented in the peacebuilding efforts of the UN, even though the need for integrating youth into peacebuilding has been articulated for quite some time. However, there are already a number of projects to look into.

The Republic of Burundi is a country in which ethnic and political violence has recurred. The cycle of conflict creates a lot of movement of people within the country. This creates difficulties in integrating refugees into new host areas as prejudices and different ethnicities cause divide amongst groups of people. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) has implemented a peacebuilding programme that focuses on helping youth take on leadership roles and develop peacebuilding skills to create resilience towards conflict and thus prevent future conflict outbreak. An example are Alfred and Eugénie, both aged 24, who work as a peer educators in their towns. Their goal is to ease tension between the different groups through dialogue and working on projects together. In detail they go to schools and community centres, or churches and talk to their fellows about issues that affect them directly, such as hostility and violence through conflict. The project however goes further than initiating the dialogue, young people are working together on projects, such as entrepreneurships. This particular project aims at economic independence of Youth and generating opportunities for work (UNICEF 2023).

Another economic project, as well located in the Republic of Burundi, is the cooperating launching of businesses. Young people have learned about values and ideals, such as community and solidarity. They got together and talked about their business ideas, and brought people with similar ideas, despite political differences, together. "The groups hold regular meetings and also purchase shares in each other's businesses, so that the group can provide loans if needed" (UNICEF 2023).

The Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations holds a week of workshops annually that centres around peacebuilding and projects related to it. Around 70-80 young adults come to Turkey and network, learn and exchange ideas (Ozerdem 2016). Implementing seminars and workshops like this on a more global scale could be an important step in uplifting Youth and creating opportunities for them to exchange their ideas and starting to build projects together.

5.5. Further Sources and Research Ideas

It is important that each delegate gathers further information on this topic to gain a deeper understanding of what has already been done, how successful these measures have been and what still needs to be done in the future. Furthermore, it is critical that the delegates understand their nation's position on integrating youth into peacebuilding: have they worked with the action plan or the handbook? Have monetary means been invested into this? What further funds are available? Here are the above mentioned resources as well as additional ones which can help with this research:

"Peacebuilding Commission's Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding": pbc_strategic_action_plan_on_youth_and_peacebuilding.agreed.pdf (un.org)

"Youth, Peace and Security: A Programming Handbook": yps_programming_handbook.pdf (un.org)

Peacebuilding overview: PEACEBUILDING | (un.org)

How successful has the implementation of the Strategic Action Plan been? - Written assessment: Microsoft Word - 2021 Written Assessment on the Implementation of PBC Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding version2.docx (un.org)

Who actually is "the youth"? - World Youth Report: WorldYouthReport-2030Agenda.pdf (un.org)

Secretary General Report on YPS: N2005528.pdf (un.org)

United Nations Population Fund on YPS: Youth | United Nations Population Fund (unfpa.org)

How to finance the integration of young people into peacebuilding activities: Financing_for_young_people_in_peacebuilding.220217.final_.web_.pdf

Youth and Peacebuilding: https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/peace-insight/wp-content/uploads/P889%20PD%20Youth%20LVP%20Report_V5.pdf

The UN Youth Strategy: https://www.unyouth2030.com/

6. References

Ali, H. (2021a). Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan failed long before the Taliban took over. Retrieved from https://theloop.ecpr.eu/counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan-failed-long-before-the-taliban-took-over/

Ali, H. (2021b, 10.08.2021). Holding Elections in Libya is not a Solution to the country's deep-seated Problems. *The Loop. ECPR's Political Science Blog*. Retrieved from https://theloop.ecpr.eu/holding-elections-in-libya-is-not-a-solution-to-the-countrys-deep-seated-problems/

Ali, H. (2023). Why the Military Promised to Withdraw from Power in Sudan. *Political Violence at a Glance*. Retrieved from https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2023/01/10/why-the-military-promised-to-withdraw-from-power-in-sudan/

Ali, H., Ben Hammou, S., & Powell, J. (2022). Between Coups and Election: Constitutional Engineering and Military Entrenchment in Sudan. *Africa Spectrum, 57*(3), 1-13. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/00020397221136581

CrisisGroup. (2018). International Crisis Group Report N°267 on Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Politics in Northern Mali. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/267-narcotrafic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali

European Youth Forum (2023): Launch of the European Charter for Youth and Democracy Retrieved from https://www.youthforum.org/news/launch-of-the-european-charter-for-youth-and-democracy

EUTM. (2023). European Union Training Mission in Mali. Retrieved from https://eutmmali.eu/aboutus/

Herbert, M., & Gallien, M. (2020). A Rising Tide: Trends in Production, Trafficking, and Consumption of Drugs in North Africa. Retrieved from https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/north-africa-drugs-report/

Howard, L. (2019). Peacekeeping is Not Counterinsurgency. *International Peacekeeping, 26*(5), 545-548. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2019.1677288

International Alert (2019): What is Peacebuilding? Retrieved from https://www.international-alert.org/about/what-is-peacebuilding/

MINURSO. (2023). United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Background of Mission. Retrieved from https://minurso.unmissions.org/background

MINUSMA. (2023). United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. History of MINUSMA. Retrieved from https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history

Oneko, S. (2017). Deutsche Welle Politics. Sahel trade routes: Arms, people and drugs. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/sahel-trade-routes-arms-people-and-drugs/a-37125072

Ozerdem, A. (2016) The role of youth in peacebuilding: Challenges and opportunities. Retrieved from https://gdc.unicef.org/resource/role-youth-peacebuilding-challenges-and-opportunities

Powell, J., & Thyne, C. (2022). *Global Instances of Coups, 1950-present. Version November 2022* Retrieved from: https://www.arresteddictatorship.com/global-instances-of-coups.html

UN and Folke Bernadotte Academy, Youth, Peace and Security: A Programming Handbook, New York, 2021. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/yps_programming_handbook.pdf

UNDESA: Goal 16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Retrieved from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16

UNDP (2021):New Reports: Understanding the Roles and Subcultures of Youth and Women in Peacebuilding in South Sudan. Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/south-sudan/news/new-reports-understanding-roles-and-subcultures-youth-and-women-peacebuilding-south-sudan

UNDPO. (2023). United Nations Field Missions. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/globalcall/content/field-missions

UNESCO (2019): Youth as Peacebuilders. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/paula/Downloads/372358eng.pdf

UNICEF: Youth lead by example in Burundi. Retrieved from https://www.unicef.org/stories/youth-lead-by-example-burundi

UNISFA. (2023a). United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei Summary of the UNSC Mandate Retrieved from https://unisfa.unmissions.org/mandate

UNISFA. (2023b). United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei. Summary of Mandate. Retrieved from https://unisfa.unmissions.org/mandate

UNISS. (2023). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. Retrieved from https://unis-sahel.org/

UNITAMS. (2023). United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan. Electoral

Support. Retrieved from https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/electoral-support

UNMISS. (2023). United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Mission Background. Retrieved from

https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background

UNPBC (2022a): The Peacebuilding Commission's Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding.

Retrieved from:

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/PBC_Youth%20Strategic%20Action%20Plan#:~:text=In%2

0

UNPC (2022b): Youth, Peace and Security. Retrieved from:

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/PBC_Youth%20Strategic%20Action%20Plan#:~:text=In%2

0

UNPBC (2022c): United Nations Peacebuilding. Informative Brochure. Retrieved from:

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_b

rochure_eng_corr.pdf

UNPBC. (2023). The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Retrieved from

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission

UNPK. (2023a). United Nations Peace Keeping. Principles of Peace Keeping. Retrieved from

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping

UNPK. (2023b). United Nations Peacekeeping Fatalities since 1948. Retrieved from

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities

UNSC. (2022). United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General on the Situaton in the

sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the

Sudan. Retrieved from https://unitams.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg-report-dec-

en.pdf

UNSC. (2023a). United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General: Situation

Concerning Western Sahara. Retrieved from

https://minurso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_october_2022_0.pdf

UNSC. (2023b). United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General: Situation in Mali.

Retrieved from https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2023_21-en.pdf

UNSMIL. (2023). United Nations Support Mission in Libya. Retrieved from

https://unsmil.unmissions.org/un-libya

WHO. (2023). World Health Organization Emergency Appeal: Humanitarian Crisis in Sahel Region of

Africa. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/humanitarian-crisis-in-

sahel-region-of-africa

Youth4Peace (2023): UNSCR 2419. Retrieved from:

https://youth4peace.info/unscr2419#:~:text=Resolution%202419%20%282018%29%20is%20

th

6.1. Table of Figures